Sherwig’s
well written and researched book focuses on the Guineas and Gunpowder that
accompanied British diplomacy in its struggle against revolutionary and
Napoleonic France. The book shows how the use of money developed from a
contractual agreement on the use of troops like it had been during most of the
18th century to support for cash stripped allies, amounting to 66
million pounds over a quarter century. A considerable a mount in itself, but
modest compared to the costs of the navy and the army in this period.
At first
the instrument was used selectively as in the Prussian subsidy in 1794, but
this caused resentment among other potential allies. Monetary and material
support from 1805 was offered to anyone opposing Napoleon. As such the first
surge was during the Peninsular War, where Portugal
and Spain
received support to the value of over 19 million pounds between 1808 and 1815.
But the main effort occurred on the European mainland from 1812-5 when Russia , Prussia
and Austria
together received almost 15 million pounds, and minor states over 6 million. Especially
Sweden got a good deal, if
you consider it also got Norway
out of it and did very little hard work during 1813 and 1814.
After 1805 the
British foreign ministers also tried to make it an instrument to influence
policy and strategy of allied states but as such it was only successful when
foreign troops were under direct control of British generals in the Peninsula . On the other hand this soured the
relationships with Portugal
and Spain to the point that
the former refused to send troops to the Low Countries
in 1815.
The weakest
link of supplying support to the Continent was that with British trade excluded
by the blockade, very little cash and credit was available. Some of Wellington ’s tensest letters to London were about the supply of silver and
gold coins. But it is hard to fault the effort made by the government on this
point.
The
material side is astounding as well, showing that British industry became able
to respond quickly to large surges in demand. While it had trouble supplying the
Prussian army with tens of thousands of muskets in 1807, it supplied a million
firearms to the continental allies by 1813. The interesting thing is that these
great achievements were quickly accepted by allies as normal, and demands for
British support often unrealistic.
While the
use of foreign troops through subsidies was cost effective (foreign secretary Castlereagh
estimated that a British soldier on the Continent would cost 60 to 70 pounds a
year, and foreign governments were offered 10 to 15 pounds per soldier), it surrendered
control of those troops to the interests of its allies and also did not help the
British public image. Tsar Alexander was utterly disappointed in the lack of British
military action where it would have counted in 1805 to 1807. It also allowed
Napoleon to paint foreign coalitions as instruments of British policy.
I’d say
this is a classic.