Napoleon's Imperial Headquarters

These two Osprey books form a miniseries, with the first describing the growth and zenith of Napoleon’s headquarters while the second focuses on the 1815 campaign. I bought them to get a better idea of the organisation the imperial household so I could get an idea who was who among the memoirists like Flahaut, de Montesquiou, Mameluke Ali and Fain. 

The books in question plus extra

Apart from that, it was useful to learn the distinctions between the emperor’s Aides de Camp (general officers to be used for independent assignments), his officiers d’ordonnance (junior officers used for inspections and reconnaissance) and the personal Aides de Camp of the Major-Général, Berthiér. Especially as the latter included quite a few critical of the emperor.

For my interests the first part paid too much attention to the civil household, equipment (from coaches to cutlery) and details of camp layout. I would have preferred to learn more of the actual operation of army headquarters. The more limited focus of the second booklet makes it better than its sister. It contains useful information on the composition of the staff, on travel speed and arrangements and a bit more on the actual activity in the army staff. The details on what Napoleon ate and where he slept are more useful to me here as well.

What struck me is that the books are heavily Napoleonophile: the marshals are described as unthankfull and treacherous, and all the mistakes are somebody else's fault. I was actually amazed to find that Pawly had any good words for Soult as Major-Générale. But maybe that’s just playing to the expected audience.

The obvious point to continue the quest are the first few chapters of Elting's Swords Around A Throne.

Weather Vanes: the Art of Changing Sides

Mattijs Lok: Windvanen. Napoleontische Bestuurders in de Nederlandse en Franse Restauratie (1813-1820)

A study of the political survival of Dutch and French members of the Napoleonic regime during the Restoration. This book draws its strength from the comparison between the two countries, the analysis of the rite de passage that was inherent in crossing the political lines and the description of the popular press criticising the ´weather vanes´.

Despite the political revolution of 1813/1815 many bureaucrats, officers and senior politicians remained in office. How did they manage? Over the course of the regime change, the senior politicians were able to shape the events by shifting their loyalty. They did not all do so at the same time and not always out of conviction. But by their conversion in a period when the new regime had not settled they moved the scales in the right direction, thus ingratiating themselves with the new rulers.

The new regimes needed experience bureaucrats and, being still weak, had no ambition to create an internal opposition from the start. Also, both Willem Frederik and Louis XVIII had previously sought Napoleon’s favour themselves so they could not claim the moral high ground.

There was also a striking continuity in the institutions of the old regime, despite public displays of the restoration of the ancient regime. The Napoleonic legacy was not only popular enough that a real return to the old institutions would have created such unrest as to unbalance the fledgling monarchies, the bureaucracy was also very useful to the Louis and William. The imperial system of government was a top down authoritarian administration subjected to the needs of the emperor and the military. It gave the restored monarchs more power than their ancestors had had before the revolution.

But there was such a broad sense of unease that much of the Napoleonic bureaucracy remained that this continuity was downplayed as much as possible while stressing the need for unity and reconciliation. This narrative was enforced so strongly in the Netherlands that opposition to King William was stifled for years.

But discontent could not be suppressed entirely. The most committed supporters of the returned Houses of Bourbon and Orange could not hide their disappointment. Not only did they resent that former opponents went unpunished and were even rewarded, but more so they lamented that their suffering for the cause had gone unnoticed. They had sacrificed their careers for their convictions and now felt insufficiently compensated. They took out their revenge on the weather vanes by publicly holding them to account for their lack of conviction.

A successful conversion went to several phases. The first (optional) step was a request to the old ruler to be relieved from the oath of loyalty. Next a letter was written proclaiming adhesion to the new rulers. This was often a convoluted document defending the choices for former regimes in the past. Most times this was followed by an invitation from the new prince to enter his service. This later involved swearing a new oath. The monarch later confirmed the union by continuing the noble titles from the Napoleonic regime or awarding new. Knightly orders were also instituted so the king could express his gratitude.

The move from regime to regime was by no means an easy one. In the Netherlands it took several weeks before it became clear that the rising against French rule would succeed, and many preferred to bide their time before committing themselves. In France the dismantling of Napoleon’s rule in April 1814 was more rapid, but complications erupted as the emperor returned. It forced politicians, bureaucrats and officers to make difficult choices twice in three months.

And so it went wrong occasionally, as in the cases of Dutch admiral Ver Huell and bureaucrat/general Dirk van Hogendorp. Ver Huell eventually ended up in the French Chamber of Peers, but Van Hogendorp met a tragic death in Brazil. In France marshal Ney was the prime example of failure to choose wisely. He died in front of a fire squad.

The second restoration of the Bourbons was in any way more traumatic than the first and the Dutch. To the reactionary ultra monarchists the reversal of many bureaucrats to the returned emperor was a betrayal of the magnanimous treatment they had been offered in 1814. This inspired the ultras to sweeping purges of a quarter to a third of all French bureaucrats. In some parts of the country this even escalated into mass arrests, and occasional murder and lynching. Although Louis and his government discouraged these excesses, they were nevertheless tainted by them and their legitimacy of their regime was weakened as a result.

Although this book focuses almost exclusively on the civilian side of the bureaucracy, there are some interesting bits on the military and the rite de passage analogy is readily applicable to army officers. Maybe I can use it to analyse letters by Dutch officers in the National Archives in The Hague.

Review: Napoleon 1814: The Defence of France

Napoleon 1814: The Defence of France by Andrew Uffindell

My rating: 5 of 5 stars



Excellent book: well written, well researched and adds in meaningful ways to other accounts.

Uffindel's main point is that we can't understand the actions and outcome of the campaign of France in 1814 if we look at the military in isolation from the physical, political and social conditions in which it took place. That means his account provides less detail on the battles, but offers a wider scope than traditional military

He starts out with several chapters describing the French and allied armies at the start of 1814, the state of France and the campaign area. In the second part we get an operational overview of the campaign (not much detail on the battles). Next, Uffindel analyses the campaign and the most important strategic decisions. The last part provides and overview of the experience of civilians, POWs and the sick and wounded.

Terrain and weather determined operational and tactical movement, but also led to high levels of straggling and disease. The area in which the campaign was fought was very small and could not support the armies operating in it. The allies faced the dilemma of concentrating for battle or spreading out to ease logistics. The weather was exceptionally cold, even for the time of year.

But the most important decision of the campaign was the allies crossing the Rhine in December, thus denying the resources and men of North-Eastern France to Napoleon, diminishing the credibility of his regime by showing its inability to defend the country and by putting Paris in danger, thus constraining the Emperor to the defence of his capital.

For Uffindel, time was running out for Napoleon. If he had managed to pull off a decisive victory early in the campaign, he could have re-established his credibility and gained the time and space to rebuild his army from conscripts. Many of the steps he took in late 1813, like the silencing of internal opposition and overconfident expressions in the press, gave him only a temporary respite with negative long term repercussions.

The most interesting part of the book is the last. It draws its strength from research in local archives, combined with first hand accounts from soldiers and civilians. It shows the effects of the occupation on communities and the administration (and provides a counterpoint to the French behaviour in foreign territory): provision of food and lodgings to allied soldiers, rape and plunder, collaboration and resistance, the movement of refugees and POWs, the care of sick and wounded.

It also shows the reasoning behind and the limits to Napoleon’s decision not to wage popular warfare. The occupation of north eastern France helped rally that part of the country to him as allied occupation broke the apathy of the population. But militia troops like the Garde National were of questionably quality (especially its leadership) and competed for manpower with the regular army, so they were only levied locally. Popular warfare was only possible if the population still believed in victory and guerilla’s could be supported by field armies. But sending out field armies was not a possibility with Paris under threat and by the time Napoleon made the move in late March, it was already too late.

In many places, the book provides pointers to 1815. It explains why a defensive, attritional strategy was not really and option for Napoleon. He couldn’t count on popular support to hold out, and he couldn’t afford to have foreign armies wage war at his expense on French soil.

And from my reading, the success of French aggressive cavalry tactics in 1814 may have given Napoleon and his senior commanders too much confidence in its application at Waterloo.

Of course, there were also important differences: in 1815 the alliance was much closer knit because many outstanding issues had been solved and Napoleon was no longer a realistic option. The monarchs were also not present, intervening in the direction of the campaign and battles. It made life easier for the generals. The military resources of the Low Countries and Germany were now fully available, shifting the balance further in their favour.

Napoleon also held some advantages. There was an intact army waiting for him and he had more time and space to build up his army and now had the choice where to fight. Popular support may even have been stronger for him in 1815 than in 1814, exactly because the French had experienced occupation the year before. On the other hand, he had lost the full backing of the political and military elite and they now had a legitimate alternative.




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Taken Prisoner By Cossacks

The adventures of Albrecht Nicolaas van Aerssen in Russia provide a nice insight into the less glorious part of Napoleonic warfare that is often glanced over. Albrecht is an ambitious Dutch officer in the army of the French emperor that marches into Russia in the summer of 1812. As winter comes the Russian army counterattacks and Albrecht is wounded in battle and later captured by Cossacks.

From that moment he enters a continuous struggle for survival. He needs to relocate frequently in search of better places to let his wound heal. After a few weeks he receives a regular subsistence fee from the Russian government, which does make things easier. In small groups he moves on, but it´s tough going where everybody has to think of himself in the end, just like the monks and civilians where he finds shelter.

The book is especially interesting because between the lines it portrays a society in which nobles and bourgeois from different countries (even enemies) have more in common with each other than with their poorer compatriots. There is an occasional sense of embarrassment as Albrecht spews his views on the ugly Russian serfs and the practices of Jewish traders where he is quartered. On the other hand he is treated with full honours by the Russian gentry and officers. Of course the rank and file of the French army are not treated as well, but that doesn´t seem to bother him.

This insight has been preserved for us through the notes that Van Aerssen made in captivity. Their sudden ending and the questions that leaves us is part of the charm. Some of those questions are answered by the author, his greatgrandson, who provides a broad introduction. That is helpful, because Albrecht wrote his notes for his family, who of course knew the background already.

All in all a nice and appealing book that gives a human face to a conflict involving more than a million Europeans.

Napoleon and his Marshals by Macdonell

This book is very well written: the story flows, with anecdotes sprinkled liberally but always in the service of the characterisation of the marshals. Those characterisations are masterful and bring to life men from two centuries ago, although maybe not always free from Macdonells preconceptions.

We follow the story of France’s military elite from the divisional commanders of the Army of Italy awaiting their new, unknown chief in 1795 to the death of Marmont in 1852. Short flash backs introduce the new characters as they appear on stage: their often humble backgrounds, early military careers and their rise to prominence and relation to Napoleon.

Macdonell makes two more exceptions from the description of military campaigns. The first is the story of the coup of Brumaire1799 and the second of the failed 1804 coup against Napoleon and his creation of the marshalate. To Macdonell these events were closely related.

The French revolutionary army was highly politicised, and republican and Jacobin factions competed with those that put more emphasis on return to order. This power struggle was behind the coups, and Napoleon’s creation of the marshalate was an attempt to reconcile those factions and bind them to his regime. The 1804 coup provided him with the opportunity to found a monarchy and dynasty but also removed credible alternatives for the opposition to rally around, like Moreau and Bernadotte.

In that way the list of marshals reflects Napoleon’s desire: old revolutionary heroes like Kellermann and Sérurier, Jacobins from the Army of the Rhine like Jourdan and Augereau, and his own supporters from Egypt (Davout), Italy (Berthier) and his younger days (Murat). Even Bernadotte was welcomed back.

As a whole the marshals performed their task loyally and dutifully, but their loyalty was to Napoleon, or France, not to each other. They showed inordinate egoism and ambition instead of collegiality and this proved a dangerous weakness when the master was absent, as in Spain, or unwilling to enforce cooperation, as in Russia.

Year of birth of the marshals,
most were older than Napoleon

But to Macdonell, that lack of moderation was not what brought down the Empire. He paints the decline after 1807 in gloomy colours as talented young commanders like Lasalle, Montbrun and Lannes die fighting for it. The opposition to Napoleon’s attack on Russia is described in detail and even more so the psychological effect of that campaign on for example Ney, Oudinot and Davout.

By 1813, the lust for glory and belief in the genius of the chief was no longer driving the marshals, but rather duty and loyalty. And in the end their lack of faith in the military and political judgement of the emperor led to his downfall a year later.

Even some of his oldest friends, like Marmont, switched their allegiance to the Bourbons. Others watched from the fence as he returned from Elba, professing their allegiance to France rather than the empire. Mortier dutifully escorted King Louis on his flight to the border, then returned to serve the emperor. Ney went from “I’ll bring him back in a cage” to command at Waterloo.

With so few loyal supporters left, Napoleon was forced to place his best commanders, Davout and Soult, in Paris and his headquarters. If not the deciding factor in his final defeat, it was at least critical.

A lesser book would have spent more pages on Napoleon, but Macdonell resists that temptation and focuses on the motivations and interrelations of the marshals. Their many feuds and occasional friendships. Of course, there is more to say about the marshalate as the apex of a new military aristocracy, and its diplomatic and political role.  A present day researcher might take a more systematic approach to this subject.  

Then again, this book was written eighty years ago and it shows in many other ways. For example when Macdonell reassures us that although there is no bibliography, the reader should trust that every detail is backed up by a source. But it is hard to find a better book to read by the fireside and imagine yourself just for a second next to Ney as he guards the rear of the Grande Armée, musket in hand, against the swarming cossacks in the cold and snow.

The Siege of Hamburg, Sideshow of the Fall of Napoleon

Die Eisfestung by Gabriele Hoffmann is a nice piece of history writing in accessible German. It fits in well with the other very readable history books that German publisher Piper provides to a broad audience. As far as I can see with few concessions to the thoroughness of the research involved. Sadly the only illustrations in the book are two very informative maps.

Hoffmann first sketches the revolt in Hamburg and the French recapture in Spring 1813, followed the French work on the fortifications and the tribute imposed on the inhabitants during the Summer and Autumn. This part of the book also sets the scene by introducing the main characters like Davout and several more and less important inhabitants of the city.

The book paints a reasonably positive picture of Davout. His devotion to his wife and children is only matched by that to Napoleon. The marshal puts his talents and iron will at the service of the Emperor and everything in its path, including his family, is shoved aside.  “Die Geschichte seiner grossen Militärkarriere is auch die Geschichte ihrer Geburten”, Hoffmann writes pointedly.

Similarly, any obstacle to the execution of his orders is overcome. In 1813 Davout is more determined than ever, trying to regain the favour of Napoleon after his fall from grace in the wake of the Russian debâcle. The only reason the marshal sees for leniency in dealing with the rebellious Hamburgers is that it will induce some of them to return to the city and increase their contribution to the overall goal. But as the allied troops under Benningsen close the ring around Hamburg, Davout does not hesitate to burn the outlying garden houses of the inhabitants to clear the field of fire for the defenders. He also throws the young men and the poor out of the city as he does not trust them or wish to feed them.

For the inhabitants the last year under French rule is tough. The embargo with England has destroyed much of the trade and the only employment is on the French constructions. With the French unforgiving in their effort to control the city, it loses much of its vibrancy. As the siege is laid in late December, the only reason to stay is to protect property against the French and looters. Only 55,000 of the over 100,000 inhabitants remain in the city, next to some 40,000 French, Italian, Dutch and German soldiers.

Many Hamburgers therefore experience the siege from outside the walls of their hometown. Soldiers from the Hanseatic League and rebel leaders that have retreated with the Russians in Spring 1813, wives and children of rich Hamburgers that were sent out of town during the Autumn. They all depend on networks of kinship and trade relations for housing and nourishment in Danish Holstein, liberated Mecklenburg or far off London. It is their correspondence with relations in the city that provides Hoffmann with much of her understanding of what the siege meant for civilians.

Map of the defenses of Hamburg in 1813/14

The siege itself is not particularly exciting. The freezing cold poses problems for the defenders as the main defense work, water, loses its function as an obstacle. Nevertheless, Davout´s engineers come up with creative solutions, using horse dung and ice to create new defences. Although Benningsen executes a number of attacks, he seems content to keep Europe's most talented tactician inside Hamburg with equal numbers.

This is apparently also how Napoleon saw the situation. A letter that never reached Davout the Emperor lambasts him for his inactivity against a weaker enemy. Together with similar complaints of several senior officers of Davout´s corps during the Autumn campaign, this paints an interesting contrast to the marshal´s martial prowess in the previous years. Although nobody could question his continued devotion to duty and skill as an organiser of troops, it is remarkable that after returning from Russia, he never again fought a major battle. Hoffmann slyly suggests that this may have to do with traumatic experiences in 1812.

Despite the ever worsening news from France - first invasion, then defeat and abdication - Davout is determined to hold out for his master. The loyal commander will not depend on the rumours spread by his enemies for his decisions and awaits official instructions, which don't arrive until late April. It then also becomes apparent that the Bourbons and the allies have come to a peaceful agreement and the French can leave Hamburg undefeated.

Hamburg quickly returns to its former self as inhabitants come home and merchant ships arrive from all over the world. Some refugees have even found their new partner in exile. For many, this also signals the end of their correspondence or private notes as they turn to rebuilding their lives. 

Despite his successful defense, Davout returns to France in disgrace, amid recriminations over his treatment of the population and the requisition of all bullion in the Hamburg bank. Although he now at last has time to devote to his family it is too late to see his son Jules, who was born and died during the siege. A year later the marshal will take centre stage for one final act in his tragic relationship with the man he has devoted his life to.

German bookshops, not like those at home

I went to Hamburg last week and was well intentioned to drop money on some books on the Befreiungskriege in 1813 as a context for the Waterloo campaign, the Prussian army of 1815 and how the remembrance of the Befreiungskriege and Leipzig in particular compare to that of Waterloo and the 100 Days Campaign. This is all the more interesting because Prussia (and some other German states) were the only ones involved in both battles.

Okay, five books on the Befreiungskriege is not all bad,
but the quality is mixed

The German brick & mortar book retail trade is dominated by the Thalia chain, which offers nice spacious stores with a reasonable general audience stock, including sizeable foreign language sections, and some local variance. However, their English language history section is as big as the German one.

The history sections of the independent book sellers I visited were comparable in size and scope, with the exception of the Heinrich Heine bookshop near Hamburg University, which was sadly renovating so it had only a small but interesting history selection on display. 

While the two big tomes are serious books for a broad audience, they differ in scope. Platthaus' a lively record of the actual battle, Krause's looking at the whole era of Prussian reform and ousting of French influence. Gabriele Hoffmann's book on the fate of Hamburg in 1813 and 1814 under the heel of Marshal Davout offers warm portraits of leading and not so leading participants through their private correspondence. Especially the contrast of Davout's harsh official commitment to the Napoleonic cause and his devoted but also business like relationship with his wife has struck me.

The two smaller books offer shorter introductions on the battle of Leipzig and Freiherr vom Stein. Von Stein was not only the reformer of Prussia after the 1806 defeat, but also the administrator of the areas 'liberated' by the allies in 1813. As such he had enormous influence on events behind the front in Germany, and the perspective of his regime will ahve influenced the choice of Dutch rebels against Napoleon in late 1813.

Colonial, Weimar and the mobilised nation

As a secondary objective, I was looking for books on WWI which, although in torpor, is still a topic a fancy taking on at some point in the future. But even a year before the commemoration starts, bookshops are eerily silent. Yes, lots of stuff on WWII, the Holocaust. Also lots of stuff on Prussia (general history) and Frederick the Great in particular. But the 1800-1923 period almost seems not to have happened.


Guido Knopp's history of Germany's overseas empire gives an interesting and well illustrated overview of Germany's 'Places in the Sun' in Africa and the Pacific, while also venturing into those promoting colonial expansion in Germany. The small Reclam series of cheap editions of classic books offers a bargain, which I could not resist an in depth history of the ill-fated Weimar Republic, which combined chronologic with thematic chapters. Lastly, Lutz Raphael's book looks at the social and political consequences of national mobilisation in Europe in both world wars and in between. Refreshing to have such a broad spectrum book from a non-Anglo-Saxon perspective.

I finally picked up a nice essay on the nature of war by French  philosopher Myriam Reveault d'Allonnes and an intreaguing book on the Art of Capitulation. It looks at the structure of society and war aims and how they determine the ending of wars. Could prove an interesting counterpoint to James Whitman's The Verdict of Battle and Russell Weigly's The Age of Battles. I have my problems with the concept of decisive battles, and these books give me some perspective.

Sadly, too little time

And finally a recommendation if you get to Hamburg and you're a military history buff and like in depth stuff on German (WW2) tanks, aircraft and ships. At the Bernhardt second hand book store you should have a field day. There´s much more than just WW2, but you catch my drift. It´s at Johanniswall 3, within 5-10 minutes walk from the Hauptbahnhof. Sadly not enough time and not on my subjects so I left empty handed.

So I was a bit disappointed with what I could pick up on my preferred subjects, but I ended up with a nice stack anyway.

Keegan's Waterloo

John Keegan´s Face of Battle was major influence on my thinking about warfare as it was for so many others. I read it in university as part of a military history course. I Can see more flaws in it now, but compared to the 'drum and trumpet history' that had gone before this was a significant step forward.

My well worn copy

At about the same time Geoffrey Parker's The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road was published. Together with several other historians, they formed the start of big changes in the study of military history. A turn from the view from above to the view from below, a turn towards primary sources, towards questions of 'how' and towards a more scientific approach instead of jingoism.

I picked up Keegan again recently for my research on Waterloo, and there's many valuable lessons in The Face of Battle, or at least things I will be looking at:

• Each participant only sees a fraction of the whole. He sometimes hardly even sees the enemy. Smoke, terrain obstacles and friendly or enemy troops obscure his vision, and combined with the noise and smell of battle distracts him from anything further away. However, the appearance of general officers in the own or enemy lines is frequently noticed.
• The effect of hunger, thirst, tiredness, rain and sun, corn fields and mud, alcohol and the experience of combat on a soldier's emotions
• Formations are more open than we tend to assume and even more open than implied in the descriptions by the participants. Movement is also slower. Few cavalry charges are made at the gallop; obstacles and casualties can slow them down to a crawl.
• The fate of those trying to surrender depends on the circumstances. Early in the battle there is room for capture, but rarely during the crisis. Distance always matters, because combat has a territorial quality, especially in and around buildings.
• Flight is not just a matter of casualties: the Imperial Guard suffered fewer casualties than many of the regiments opposing them.
• Also, flight seems to start at the rear of the unit (especially columns), rather than at the front. Even though Keegan can't really prove this (he only has accounts from British observers, not from French survivors) nor explain.
• Looting was pervasive, and more profitable than soldiering. It could be a threat to the order of the formation, so officers tried to prevent it during battle.
• The prospect of loot, personal honour, courage, alcohol, physical coercion might have been motivations for individuals to stand instead of run, but Keegan sees two factors as paramount: group solidarity and individual leadership.
• The formation, especially the square, provided a sense of safety in numbers (false, as Keegan notes). The integrity of the formation was symbolised by the regimental colours and they were attacked and defended with great effort.
• Officers were primarily motivated by their reputation among their peers.  Honour was highly individual, and less tied to the regiment than in later days. In a sense it was a professional code of conduct and stoic acceptance of risk was the measure of it. Getting wounded in the execution of duty and continuing in the field was the highest form of honour for officers to aspire to. 

I can see now that there are severe limitations to the Siborne files, with their disdain for and ignorance of the other participants in the battle. But in the early 1970s it was the easiest accessible corpus of eyewitness accounts on the battle. We're very privileged to have so many other accounts readily available now from Dutch, French and German participants.

This of course has changed the narrative of the battle as a whole (Keegan falls into the same traps as Wheeler and other people who just looked at British and the odd French accounts), but I think the parts on the nature of battle can stand the test of time much better and that of course was his main object with the book. To get an idea of what it was like.

Keegan's book may not have found all the answers, but it was the first to ask the questions.

This last point is one that I think is very important and actually goes against what Keegan says about the lack of loyalty in the new Dutch-Belgian army. The picture of the professional officer he paints is as valid for other armies as it is for the British. Officers were motivated by professional pride, and therefor served as well and as loyal in foreign armies as in that of their home country. Jomini, Clausewitz and the Prince of Orange are well known cases, but many French émigrees served abroad, Irish and Swiss served with credit in the French army. They took their professional alignment very seriously. In 1813-1814 Dutch officers didn't just walk out of the French army, but waited until released from their duty or formally gave up their commission.

This is proved to a large extent by their conduct in the 100 days campaign, where officers generally served their armies faithfully, as did Dutch, Belgian and German officers in French service. Of course we don't know what would have happened had Napoleon won at Waterloo, but I think the amount of officers changing sides would have been small.

The loyalty of the general officers and rank and file was another matter. For the former, loyalty was not to their duty but to their political masters: monarchs (or parliaments). Their relation to the regime could have significant impact on their carreers, especially if they also had political roles or ambitions. Ney's flip-flopping is a case in point (more about that some other time). Napoleon had many reasons to distrust his marshals.

For the rank and file, conscripts in most cases, there was little expectation of loyalty. National sentiments were not by any means as developed as a century later, and few could be expected to foster warm feelings for the ruling elite. Draft dodging was common, especially when the regime was unpopular or the chances of success were deemed low. And once conscripted, many went absent without leave. But as they were loyal to no one, they could also not be expected to rapidly enter the opposing army of their of free will. I think Napoleon would also be disappointed in the number of soldiers joining his eagles should he have proved triumphant.

What Abba says about the memory of Waterloo

"My, my, at Waterloo Napoleon did surrender
Oh yeah, and I have met my destiny in quite a similar way
The history book on the shelf
 Is always repeating itself"

Okay, apart from the slight historical inaccuracy in the above lyrics, even in 1974 Waterloo was still very much in the public mind. Enough at least to help win a Eurovision song contest. Not only did Abba gain the coveted prize, it also became a hit record for them and the start of their international breakthrough.

Napoleon, as ever taking the credit for the work of others

In that year 17 countries competed, with 10 jurors from each participating country giving a point to their favourite song. Abba won with 24 points, among which a massive 5 from Finland and Switzerland. Former allies the Netherlands gifted 3 points, (West-)Germany 2 and Luxembourg 1, but Great Britain and Belgium refused their love. France didn't take part in the competition, because French president Pompidou had died a week before, so we don't know how French jurors would have reacted.

However, we have some information on the chart success of the song. According to wikipedia the record went to number 1 in Belgium, Great-Britain, Eire and (West)-Germany, but only reached number 2 in the Netherlands and 3 in France. While a certain restraint was to be expected from France, not exactly the star of the song, Dutch lukewarm reception is suspect. Especially as the song reached #1 in Denmark, the country whose contingent arrived to late in the Low Countries to take part in the campaign.

The song was originally called Honey Pie, but I can't imagine it winning the contest with that title. Bennie and Björn also showed good sense of the musical mood as they moved the musical arrangement closer to disco and of the fashion trends as they latched on to glitter. Sadly, the Eurovision song contest never moved on in both the fields.

But the real question is: why didn't Abba sing about the battle of Leipzig, a battle that they at least participated in?

All Shill For Quatre Bras book by Erwin Muilwijk

Also in the mail last week: Erwin Muilwijk's second volume in his history of the Dutch army during the Waterloo campaign: Perponcher's Gamble. This concerns the Battle at Quatre Bras, where a Dutch vanguard managed to hold out long enough for the rest of the Allied army to come up and hold the cross roads at the village.

The black & white and the colour version

Erwin's book fills some gaps that English (and other) writers have neglected to lack of Dutch language skills or the fact that Wellington was having a chat with Blücher somewhere else at the time. For them the battle only starts when Wellington returns.

The maps and illustrations add a lot to the story, because some episodes were confusing even to the participants. It helps to figure out what was going on and where. I heartily recommend the colour version to take full advantage of them, but for the cheapskates (and all others) there is a downloadable version of the maps.

The two extra contributions by Ab Küchler on the Quatre Bras painting by Pieneman and Marco Bijl on the Bois de Bossu also provide added value.

I did have a small role in getting this book to the printer, although I still think a native speaker would have done much better.

Next up is the book on the Battle of Waterloo itself, to be published in about a year from now. Must read for anyone that is interested in the Waterloo campaign or the Dutch army of the Napoleonic and restauration period

Master of Europe - Megagame of the Leipzig campaign

Given the 200 year anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig Megagames Nederland will be running Master of Europe, a megagame designed by Brian Cameron and Jim Wallman that brings you all the drama of the autumn campaign of 1813.

On the one hand the military campaign throwing the Russian, Prussian, Swedish and Austrian armies against the rebuilt Grande Armée in a struggle for the control of Germany. On the other hand the political manoeuvring between the four allied monarchs and their ministers and Napoleon and his German underlings. Can the allies force Napoleon back and will they be able to wrestle away his control over a continent?

This game was designed by Brian Cameron and Jim Wallman and played before on several occasions in the United Kingdom. Brian and Jim have been so kind to allow us to use their design.

When & Where

The game will take place Saturday 22nd of June at Activiteitencentrum Doddendaal in Nijmegen, The Netherlands. This is the same place as last year’s Barbarossa game.

Costs to participate in the game are 25€ for players and 12,50€ for umpires. You can enlist individually or as a group. To register, follow this link to our website. We will try to fit players to their preferences where possible.

Have a look at our website for the roles and nations involved
and register for the game!

For more information see our website, or contact megagamesnl@gmail.com

I’ll be bringing you updates in the coming months.

You can also follow us on Twitter @megagamesnl
and on Facebook at the Megagamesnl page.
Apart from upcoming games we also bring you a lot of stuff about military history and innovative ways of gaming

Hope to see you in June!