Review: Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807-1815

Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807-1815 by Peter Paret

My rating: 5 of 5 stars

Great book on the Prussian reforms before and after Jena-Auerstädt. Shows that it was not just a case of noble and visionary reformers vs dumb reactionaries, but a struggle in which military theories and practice were linked to but also conflicted with legal privileges, social attitudes and personal rivalries.

Considering the opposition it is amazing how much was achieved and one wonders what might have happened if Scharnhorst hadn´t died so young and peace hadn´t come so soon. In any case, the reforms turned the Prussian army from a laggard into a front runner, despite the rough edges.

Yorck´s role in all of this is much more interesting than many historians have it (and that includes recent historians who have simply repeated the myths of the past). Yorck was in many ways closer to the reformers than most, looking at his practice as a commander of the Jäger and the infantry regulations and training programmes he helped to write. On the other hand, he was quite aware that the consequences of the social change not only undermined his status and legitimacy as a noble, but thereby also that of other institutions. And he was a pain in the arse to work with.

All this lovingly analysed and extensively researched by the author.



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Weather Vanes: the Art of Changing Sides

Mattijs Lok: Windvanen. Napoleontische Bestuurders in de Nederlandse en Franse Restauratie (1813-1820)

A study of the political survival of Dutch and French members of the Napoleonic regime during the Restoration. This book draws its strength from the comparison between the two countries, the analysis of the rite de passage that was inherent in crossing the political lines and the description of the popular press criticising the ´weather vanes´.

Despite the political revolution of 1813/1815 many bureaucrats, officers and senior politicians remained in office. How did they manage? Over the course of the regime change, the senior politicians were able to shape the events by shifting their loyalty. They did not all do so at the same time and not always out of conviction. But by their conversion in a period when the new regime had not settled they moved the scales in the right direction, thus ingratiating themselves with the new rulers.

The new regimes needed experience bureaucrats and, being still weak, had no ambition to create an internal opposition from the start. Also, both Willem Frederik and Louis XVIII had previously sought Napoleon’s favour themselves so they could not claim the moral high ground.

There was also a striking continuity in the institutions of the old regime, despite public displays of the restoration of the ancient regime. The Napoleonic legacy was not only popular enough that a real return to the old institutions would have created such unrest as to unbalance the fledgling monarchies, the bureaucracy was also very useful to the Louis and William. The imperial system of government was a top down authoritarian administration subjected to the needs of the emperor and the military. It gave the restored monarchs more power than their ancestors had had before the revolution.

But there was such a broad sense of unease that much of the Napoleonic bureaucracy remained that this continuity was downplayed as much as possible while stressing the need for unity and reconciliation. This narrative was enforced so strongly in the Netherlands that opposition to King William was stifled for years.

But discontent could not be suppressed entirely. The most committed supporters of the returned Houses of Bourbon and Orange could not hide their disappointment. Not only did they resent that former opponents went unpunished and were even rewarded, but more so they lamented that their suffering for the cause had gone unnoticed. They had sacrificed their careers for their convictions and now felt insufficiently compensated. They took out their revenge on the weather vanes by publicly holding them to account for their lack of conviction.

A successful conversion went to several phases. The first (optional) step was a request to the old ruler to be relieved from the oath of loyalty. Next a letter was written proclaiming adhesion to the new rulers. This was often a convoluted document defending the choices for former regimes in the past. Most times this was followed by an invitation from the new prince to enter his service. This later involved swearing a new oath. The monarch later confirmed the union by continuing the noble titles from the Napoleonic regime or awarding new. Knightly orders were also instituted so the king could express his gratitude.

The move from regime to regime was by no means an easy one. In the Netherlands it took several weeks before it became clear that the rising against French rule would succeed, and many preferred to bide their time before committing themselves. In France the dismantling of Napoleon’s rule in April 1814 was more rapid, but complications erupted as the emperor returned. It forced politicians, bureaucrats and officers to make difficult choices twice in three months.

And so it went wrong occasionally, as in the cases of Dutch admiral Ver Huell and bureaucrat/general Dirk van Hogendorp. Ver Huell eventually ended up in the French Chamber of Peers, but Van Hogendorp met a tragic death in Brazil. In France marshal Ney was the prime example of failure to choose wisely. He died in front of a fire squad.

The second restoration of the Bourbons was in any way more traumatic than the first and the Dutch. To the reactionary ultra monarchists the reversal of many bureaucrats to the returned emperor was a betrayal of the magnanimous treatment they had been offered in 1814. This inspired the ultras to sweeping purges of a quarter to a third of all French bureaucrats. In some parts of the country this even escalated into mass arrests, and occasional murder and lynching. Although Louis and his government discouraged these excesses, they were nevertheless tainted by them and their legitimacy of their regime was weakened as a result.

Although this book focuses almost exclusively on the civilian side of the bureaucracy, there are some interesting bits on the military and the rite de passage analogy is readily applicable to army officers. Maybe I can use it to analyse letters by Dutch officers in the National Archives in The Hague.

A Bold and Ambitious Enterprise by Andrew Bamford

In December 1813 the British cabinet decided to create a force to operate in the Low Countries to assure that the area came under friendly rule, for which a suitable dynasty was quickly found in the House of Orange. Task of the force was to ensure the security of the new regime, then the expansion of that regime in to present day Belgium and the destruction of the French fleet in Antwerp if not the capture of the town. This book relates the story of that ‘bold and ambitious enterprise’.

I found the book interesting for three reasons:

A Bold and Ambitious Enterprise tells the story of a significant part of the army that would fight Napoleon at Quatre Bras and Waterloo a year later. It was led by the aged but capable general Graham, who had served with Wellington in the Peninsula. Its origins were not very fateful, cobbled together from units recovering and rebuilding from service elsewhere. Many of the men were only partially trained or otherwise unfit for service. It took time to gather enough strength to take aggressive action, but in reality was unable to do so without support from allied troops.

Although the troops performed as well as might be expected in two small scale attacks against the defences of Antwerp, the force failed its toughest test: the storming of Bergen op Zoom. This weak and isolated French garrison was a thorn in the flesh of the allies, occupying troops that Graham wished to employ against his main objective. The failure of the attack resulted mostly from insufficient troops employed and failure of leadership by senior commanders. Some went off on their own, thus leaving troops leaderless, other showed a lack of initiative. It all ended in half of the forces killed, wounded or captured. All this bodes ill for the performance a year later.

De Gevangenpoort or Prisoners Gate between the town centre and harbour
A British section held out here until forced away in the morning

The book also provides a counterpoint to the better known developments in France. Although this is just a sideshow, it shows the ways in which the area might have been more important had Napoleon successfully held off the Schlesische Armee and the Hauptarmee. It is interesting to see how the course of the war in France progressively allows or demands more troops to be shifted south.

Finally, it has more consideration for the position of Britain´s allies, ie the Dutch and Prussians, than most British authors. This prevents the book from the all too familiar blame game. Although Graham kept trying to get his allies to cooperate in a move against Antwerp (his main objective), it was understandable that their efforts were limited by overriding considerations elsewhere. The book also shows that quite a few people in prominent places during the Waterloo campaign had already acquainted themselves with their allies and struck up a workable relationship (eg Cooke, Bülow and Van Gorkum). That would prove useful.

The book is well written and makes good use of personal accounts. Although I didn’t care much for the details of British involvement, it was nice to read about the attack on Bergen op Zoom, having visited the town in September. Too bad not much of the fortress has remained.

Review: French Guardsman vs Russian Jaeger: 1812-14

French Guardsman vs Russian Jaeger: 1812-14 by Laurence Spring

My rating: 3 of 5 stars



I’m not decided about this new Osprey Combat series yet. Not surprisingly, this series feels a lot like the Duel series where tanks, combat planes and ships are compared. The results there are mixed, and I’m less a hardware man than a tactics man, so I have only bought one or two of those.

It’s a good thing that Osprey’s taking a few lesser known Napoleonic actions and focussing more on the tactics, but the series is hampered by combining tidbits you’d expect in Warrior series (recruiting, equipment), Essential History (Background), Campaign (Into Combat) and Elite (tactics). In this case it meant that it took a long time before you got to the actual battles.

Author Laurence Spring has a good knowledge of the period and, most importantly, first hand accounts of the battles (although those on Leipzig are very limited, but I guess they needed to include one big battle) which add spice to the narrative. In fact the account of the Young Guard Voltigeurs’ destruction ay Krasnyi had me holding my breath. But this is what I would have wanted more of, and less historical introduction.

Also, the choice of Russian Jaeger and French Young Guard is not the most obvious, because they are not wholly different troop types. In fact, as Spring shows, they both could use light infantry tactics and operate in close formation.

This doesn’t mean that the idea behind the series can’t work. But there have to be significant differences in tactics or equipment between the two sides to make it work. I can see how Zulu Warrior vs British infantryman could work, or Greek hoplite vs Roman legionary or in even terms of Napoleonics: Cuirassier vs infantry (I would actually love to see an Osprey book about horse artillery in action). But the present choices seem too similar.

So my gripes so far with this series is not that I don’t like the idea, but that they make the wrong choices of adversaries and what to focus on. The choice for small and lesser known actions combined with tactics and first hand accounts has my blessing. I’ll catch another one from the series later, but don’t hold my hopes too high.




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Review: Radetzky: Imperial Victor and Military Genius

Radetzky: Imperial Victor and Military Genius by Alan Sked

My rating: 3 of 5 stars



This book fails for trying too hard. Sked is so busy insisting on Radetzky’s genius without always providing sufficient proof that the reader becomes suspicious. Sked always takes the Austrian side, and among Austrians always that of Radetzky.

There is no doubt that Radetzky was a very brave and capable officer, and his early career provides numerous examples in various theatres and roles. In the wake of the defeat at Wagram, the 42 year old general was appointed as chief of the general staff. In the following years he would be instrumental in rebuilding the Austrian army from scarce means and leading it to victory and the occupation of Paris in 1814.

He would remain active as a commander, thinker and organiser in the following 35 years. But his finest hour would be his victory at old age in 1848 and 1849 against Italian revolutionaries and nationalist led by the king of Sardinia-Piedmont. Clearly, Sked is most at home in the crisis of revolutionary Italy in 1848-9 (on which he has published before). This is where he uses primary sources at great length to support his narrative.

But his account of the Napoleonic Wars is based on secondary sources. Surprisingly, Radetzky sometimes doesn’t actively contribute for several pages, as if he’s not the driving force that Sked maintains he is. I would have been curious to know how Schwarzenberg, commander of the allied army, and Radetzky interacted: was Schwarzenberg the guy who sold Radetzky’s plans to the monarchs or did he add his own ideas? When Schwarzenberg is said to have made a decision, was it really his? Radetzky’s strategic principles are set out clearly, but what was his day to day role in the army? This lack of added detail means that his description of the 1813 and 1814 campaign adds very little to other accounts.




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Blücher, or the Burden of Command

Reading Roger Parkinson´s biography of Marshal Blücher I was confronted, more than in other military biographies, by the physical and emotional strain of military life, and command in particular. It may be Parkinson's inclusion of many fragments of Blücher's letters to his wife, in which he is very frank about his ailments and condition, that pointed this to me so strongly. 

What I want to do in the following, is to sketch the elements of physical and emotional hardships to which the Hussar General and his contemporaries were exposed. This is probably not a complete list and I would appreciate if any reader would use the comment section to provide further suggestions and examples.

Throughout the book you get a good idea of how tough it was to be a commander in the Napoleonic age. The challenges were physical and mental, and sometime both at the same time. The marshal is also a good example of how commanders dealt with the stress.

The Physical

Campaigning was hard business. Commanders were expected to travel long distances on horseback on the march and on the battlefield. This was also not particularly comfortable, with bad roads and lots of cross country riding, so it helped to be an experienced rider. Since this was the fastest and most flexible mode of transport, commanders only reluctantly switched to carriages. Blücher did this only when he was not fit enough to travel on horseback, but never in battle.

Apart from travel, commanders spent time on administrative duties although Blücher was happy to leave that to his staff. Correspondence with other general officers and political could not be delegated as easily.

Although for officers accommodation was often much better than for the rank and file, there are a number of instances where even the Prussian commander in chief slept on the field wrapped in a cloak. Because of the amount of travel and other duties in a day, sleep was mostly short and night were often broken with urgent messages. Most letters to the home front contained some reference to tiredness.

In these conditions and with full exposure to the weather, it is not surprising that illness was a regular feature of campaign life, and Blücher caught a few bad ones in addition to some recurring ailments. When worn out he would often complain of inflammation of his eyes, which reduced his sight. After the victorious battle of Laon, the marshal's health failed completely and he was unable to exert effective command for weeks.

The Mental

Command was draining emotionally as much as physically. The responsibility for the lives of so many and the political consequences of failures were high. Throughout the campaigns of 1813 to 1815, Blücher was driven by his memory of the humiliation of 1806 and the near dissolution of the Prussian state as a result. Knowing the ability of Napoleon to bounce back from defeat, he drove as hard as possible to make the most of his victories by hot pursuit and keeping pressure to keep his enemy off balance.

Responsibility became personal when it led to the loss of close colleagues, friends and relatives. Blücher was deeply shaken by the death of his friend and chief of staff Scharnhorst.

Leadership also included overcoming opposition from your own side. Corps commanders Yorck and Langeron posed considerable challenges to Blücher's authority. Differences of opinion would mix with conflicts of character to ruin plans and paralyse operations. Blücher's letters to his wife are full of frustrations over missed opportunities and misinterpreted communications.

But superiors could prove as troublesome as  subordinates. Monarchs intervened in campaigns out of political considerations, reducing the freedom of the field commander. The 1813-1814 campaigns were particular examples of this due to the presence of the monarchs in the theatre of operations. Blücher was so disappointed in the lenient terms of the Paris peace treaty in 1814 that he offered the King his resignation. This soured his relationship with his old friends Gneisenau and Hardenberg in the early stages of the Waterloo campaign.

High command could be a very lonely place. Although the Prussian marshal was relatively open and friendly with his staff, French marshals were known to be withdrawn and reluctant to share information and privacy with their subordinates. Ney, who had been a fairly approachable general, changed to a more reticent nature when he became a marshal and often dined alone. The deepest emotions could often only be shared with close relatives. Blücher, Ney and Davout poured out their hearts to their wives in their letters, but saw them very seldomly.

Where The Twain Meet

But the biggest and most traumatic element of command was combat. With the importance of example and intervention on the battlefield, commanders often exposed themselves in the front lines to rally retreating troops, to react to enemy moves and to lead attacks. Cannon balls would reach furthest, but generals were often close enough to the front to be within musket range or even get tangled up in melee.

Considering the state of battlefield surgery and medicine, getting wounded was life treathening even if not immediately lethal. So it was proved by Blücher's chief of staff Scharnhorst, who died in June 1813 of a neglected wound.

As a cavalry commander, Blücher would often lead its charges. In one such instance at the close of the battle of Ligny, his horse was wounded by a musket ball, and fell upon him. The quick reaction of his adjudant Nostitz prevented his capture by French cavaly, but his fall left him unconscious for several hours and he only came to in the nick of time to direct the Prussian army towards Wavre, rather than Liège.

At Lützen (or Groß Görschen as the Prussians would argue), a musket ball grazed his back as he led yet another cavalry charge. This superficial wound made horse riding most uncomfortable, with the wound occasionally opening again.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the old hussar was in his element in this environment and his staff often had to urge him to be more cautious. So physical courage should be considered a necessary condition for a field command. It was so much part of the officer ethos that I have found very few examples from this age admitting fear. If officers talked about disgust or emotion, it was mainly over exceptionally brutal behaviour, such as after storming of cities.

But the case of Blücher's son Franz is a good illustration of the mental impact of a physical wound. Blücher junior was wounded by a blow to the head (probably at the battle of Dresden) and captured by the French. Although he returned to active service after his liberation from a French hospital in the autumn of 1813, he later developed a mental condition (post traumatic stress disorder?) which led to his institutionalisation until his death. This was a cause for much grief to his father.

Release Or Breakdown

Even though most of these men can be considered experienced campaigners who had seen it all, it is clear that the trauma and stress was too big to shrug off. So they found release in alcohol, gambling, dancing and sex. The field marshal was very fond of the first three (even raking up such debts in his later years that he needed to ask his monarch to help out) but I have found no reference to the latter. Given the common occurrence of mistresses and prostitutes in this period among his colleagues, I think it unlikely that Blücher would not have joined in the fun.

Sometimes even that was not enough. Wellington, prime example of the Etonian stiff upper lip, was moved to tears after Waterloo. But it could get worse...

It seems that the iron will of the marshal sometime pushed him over the edge. His most celebrated mental breakdown occurred in the years after Jena and Auerstädt, when he was sidelined as commander in Pommerania while he saw Prussia constantly humiliated by Napoleon. He developed hallucinations and even claimed that he was pregnant with an elephant. This condition lasted for several months.

The story of Blücher´s physical collapse in March 1814 also shows how precarious the hierarchy was. Hallucinating and blinded by infected eyes, he was restricted to bed and incapable of command. When Gneisenau started to issue orders in the absence of the chief, experienced but troublesome corps commander Yorck almost immediately handed in is resignation and could only be recalled by waking Blücher temporarily from his hallucinations.

Gneisenau, although a great chief of staff, seemed paralysed by the responsibility and the senior corps commander, French émigré in Russian service, Count Langeron also stepped back. The decision was therefor made to keep the patient in nominal command until he recovered. But the army was effectively immobilised for almost two weeks.

And by the summer of 1815, the old marshal finally had had his fill of warfare, as he wrote in a letter to his wife. He longed for home, his wife and quiet.

The Siege of Hamburg, Sideshow of the Fall of Napoleon

Die Eisfestung by Gabriele Hoffmann is a nice piece of history writing in accessible German. It fits in well with the other very readable history books that German publisher Piper provides to a broad audience. As far as I can see with few concessions to the thoroughness of the research involved. Sadly the only illustrations in the book are two very informative maps.

Hoffmann first sketches the revolt in Hamburg and the French recapture in Spring 1813, followed the French work on the fortifications and the tribute imposed on the inhabitants during the Summer and Autumn. This part of the book also sets the scene by introducing the main characters like Davout and several more and less important inhabitants of the city.

The book paints a reasonably positive picture of Davout. His devotion to his wife and children is only matched by that to Napoleon. The marshal puts his talents and iron will at the service of the Emperor and everything in its path, including his family, is shoved aside.  “Die Geschichte seiner grossen Militärkarriere is auch die Geschichte ihrer Geburten”, Hoffmann writes pointedly.

Similarly, any obstacle to the execution of his orders is overcome. In 1813 Davout is more determined than ever, trying to regain the favour of Napoleon after his fall from grace in the wake of the Russian debâcle. The only reason the marshal sees for leniency in dealing with the rebellious Hamburgers is that it will induce some of them to return to the city and increase their contribution to the overall goal. But as the allied troops under Benningsen close the ring around Hamburg, Davout does not hesitate to burn the outlying garden houses of the inhabitants to clear the field of fire for the defenders. He also throws the young men and the poor out of the city as he does not trust them or wish to feed them.

For the inhabitants the last year under French rule is tough. The embargo with England has destroyed much of the trade and the only employment is on the French constructions. With the French unforgiving in their effort to control the city, it loses much of its vibrancy. As the siege is laid in late December, the only reason to stay is to protect property against the French and looters. Only 55,000 of the over 100,000 inhabitants remain in the city, next to some 40,000 French, Italian, Dutch and German soldiers.

Many Hamburgers therefore experience the siege from outside the walls of their hometown. Soldiers from the Hanseatic League and rebel leaders that have retreated with the Russians in Spring 1813, wives and children of rich Hamburgers that were sent out of town during the Autumn. They all depend on networks of kinship and trade relations for housing and nourishment in Danish Holstein, liberated Mecklenburg or far off London. It is their correspondence with relations in the city that provides Hoffmann with much of her understanding of what the siege meant for civilians.

Map of the defenses of Hamburg in 1813/14

The siege itself is not particularly exciting. The freezing cold poses problems for the defenders as the main defense work, water, loses its function as an obstacle. Nevertheless, Davout´s engineers come up with creative solutions, using horse dung and ice to create new defences. Although Benningsen executes a number of attacks, he seems content to keep Europe's most talented tactician inside Hamburg with equal numbers.

This is apparently also how Napoleon saw the situation. A letter that never reached Davout the Emperor lambasts him for his inactivity against a weaker enemy. Together with similar complaints of several senior officers of Davout´s corps during the Autumn campaign, this paints an interesting contrast to the marshal´s martial prowess in the previous years. Although nobody could question his continued devotion to duty and skill as an organiser of troops, it is remarkable that after returning from Russia, he never again fought a major battle. Hoffmann slyly suggests that this may have to do with traumatic experiences in 1812.

Despite the ever worsening news from France - first invasion, then defeat and abdication - Davout is determined to hold out for his master. The loyal commander will not depend on the rumours spread by his enemies for his decisions and awaits official instructions, which don't arrive until late April. It then also becomes apparent that the Bourbons and the allies have come to a peaceful agreement and the French can leave Hamburg undefeated.

Hamburg quickly returns to its former self as inhabitants come home and merchant ships arrive from all over the world. Some refugees have even found their new partner in exile. For many, this also signals the end of their correspondence or private notes as they turn to rebuilding their lives. 

Despite his successful defense, Davout returns to France in disgrace, amid recriminations over his treatment of the population and the requisition of all bullion in the Hamburg bank. Although he now at last has time to devote to his family it is too late to see his son Jules, who was born and died during the siege. A year later the marshal will take centre stage for one final act in his tragic relationship with the man he has devoted his life to.