British Invasion

A colleague of mine gave me this interesting little book. When he read my Waterloo book he revealed that he’d done a documentary in 2011 on the recovery of the bones of a British soldier in the Dutch dunes near Groote Keeten.

The soldier had died on the 27^th of August 1799, during the landing of a British invasion force on the Dutch coast. The intention was to raise the Dutch  against their French allies and for the previous sovereign, Stadtholder William V of Orange. When the French had conquered the Dutch Republic in 1795 they installed a satellite government of Dutch revolutionaries.

Although the British invasion force managed to gain the Dutch fleet base (and fleet) at Den Helder and the city of Alkmaar, they were unable to make more headway towards Amsterdam, even after being reinforced by a Russian expeditionary force. Neither had Orangist sympathisers made much of a showing. Late in the year, the British and Russians reembarked, leaving little trace.

The discovery of the remains of the British soldier lead to an archeological dig at the site. The book describes the research, based on the finds at the site linked to historical evidence.

There’s the estimates of length and age based on the skeleton, the analysis of the wood and metals of a musket, some cloth and buttons which all go some way to identifying it as the remains of a soldier of the Coldstream Guards.

A more precise identification was not possible, although based on letters and official records, the search could be narrowed down to a handful of individuals who had died on the 27^th of August.

In 2012 the remains were returned to the Coldstream Guards for interment in Britain.

Review: Hell Upon Water

Hell Upon Water by Paul Chamberlain

My rating: 4 of 5 stars



Well written and well researched book about the prisoners of war kept in Great Britain during the Napoleonic Wars. Most of these were French, but also included French allies, Americans (from 1812) and even British soldiers who had misbehaved.

Although life in the prisons was no pleasure, Chamberlain makes every effort to show that it wasn't too bad and most British officials earnestly tried to provide for the men in their care.

Part of the problem was the breakdown in Anglo-French agreements over care and exchange of civilians captured at the recommencement of hostilities in 1803. This meant that the French refused to pay for the food and lodging, but also that there were hardly any exchanges. French soldiers therefore knew they were in it for a long time and this created further problems for discipline.

However, the vast majority of prisoners seems to have behaved as well as might be expected in confinement. Escapes and mutinies were rare and even officers rarely broke their parole to escape.

The best bits of the book are where Chamberlain describes the social stratification of the prisoners, but Chamberlain also extensively describes how they occupied themselves with crafts like carving, straw work and forgery.

The officers on parole and the craftsmen through their sale on markets became a part of the local communities, even resulting in a few marriages and permanent settlement. Another nice feature of the book is the many examples of remaining signs of the POWs in artifacts, graves and geographical names like Frenchmen's Road.



View all my reviews

A Bold and Ambitious Enterprise by Andrew Bamford

In December 1813 the British cabinet decided to create a force to operate in the Low Countries to assure that the area came under friendly rule, for which a suitable dynasty was quickly found in the House of Orange. Task of the force was to ensure the security of the new regime, then the expansion of that regime in to present day Belgium and the destruction of the French fleet in Antwerp if not the capture of the town. This book relates the story of that ‘bold and ambitious enterprise’.

I found the book interesting for three reasons:

A Bold and Ambitious Enterprise tells the story of a significant part of the army that would fight Napoleon at Quatre Bras and Waterloo a year later. It was led by the aged but capable general Graham, who had served with Wellington in the Peninsula. Its origins were not very fateful, cobbled together from units recovering and rebuilding from service elsewhere. Many of the men were only partially trained or otherwise unfit for service. It took time to gather enough strength to take aggressive action, but in reality was unable to do so without support from allied troops.

Although the troops performed as well as might be expected in two small scale attacks against the defences of Antwerp, the force failed its toughest test: the storming of Bergen op Zoom. This weak and isolated French garrison was a thorn in the flesh of the allies, occupying troops that Graham wished to employ against his main objective. The failure of the attack resulted mostly from insufficient troops employed and failure of leadership by senior commanders. Some went off on their own, thus leaving troops leaderless, other showed a lack of initiative. It all ended in half of the forces killed, wounded or captured. All this bodes ill for the performance a year later.

De Gevangenpoort or Prisoners Gate between the town centre and harbour
A British section held out here until forced away in the morning

The book also provides a counterpoint to the better known developments in France. Although this is just a sideshow, it shows the ways in which the area might have been more important had Napoleon successfully held off the Schlesische Armee and the Hauptarmee. It is interesting to see how the course of the war in France progressively allows or demands more troops to be shifted south.

Finally, it has more consideration for the position of Britain´s allies, ie the Dutch and Prussians, than most British authors. This prevents the book from the all too familiar blame game. Although Graham kept trying to get his allies to cooperate in a move against Antwerp (his main objective), it was understandable that their efforts were limited by overriding considerations elsewhere. The book also shows that quite a few people in prominent places during the Waterloo campaign had already acquainted themselves with their allies and struck up a workable relationship (eg Cooke, Bülow and Van Gorkum). That would prove useful.

The book is well written and makes good use of personal accounts. Although I didn’t care much for the details of British involvement, it was nice to read about the attack on Bergen op Zoom, having visited the town in September. Too bad not much of the fortress has remained.

Reading priorities for January

There's a bunch of books I hope to be reading this month in five groups:

 

• The biographies of Willem I and Willem II regarding their activities up to 1815

• 1814 Campaign. For lessons to Napoleon and general strategical dilemma of defense of France, as well as performance of French and allied armies. Already did Uffindel, next Leggiere's Fall of Napoleon, Petre's Napoleon at Bay and Bamford's Bold and Ambitious Enterprise

• Dutch Army 1780-1815. Showing experience, organisation, mobilisation post 1813 etc. Whole bunch of books & articles

• Dutch economy 1780-1815: De Vries & Van der Woude, as well as Van Zanden & Van Riel

• Economics and mobilisation of other main powers. Bunch of books, but hardly complete.

Review: Emigre and Foreign Troops in British Service (2) 1803-15

Emigre and Foreign Troops in British Service (2) 1803-15 by René Chartrand

My rating: 2 of 5 stars



Second part of Chartrand’s overview of foreign units in British service. As in the revolutionary wars, the British used many foreign units to increase their army. The foreign element in the regular army increased from 17,000 (or about 11%) in early 1804 tot 54,000 (over a fifth) in late 1813.

There was a change in recruiting grounds, however. With access to the continent limited by extended French control and many French émigrées reconciled with the Napoleonic order, the Mediterranean now became a major source of manpower, with Spanish, Italians, Greeks, Albanians, Maltese, Minorcans enlisted. Outside Europe native troops were taken on extensively (in addition to native troops of the East India Company).

Of course, the King’s German Legion and Brunswick contingents still remained as ‘European’ foreigners (but these are treated in separate Osprey books). The 60th regiment also was mostly composed of Germans and other foreigners.

Like its sister book, this is rather an eclectic list of units and uniform details, lacking a overarching narrative, let alone analysis. Only for people with special interest in this subject.




View all my reviews

Review: Emigre and Foreign Troops in British Service (1) 1792-1803

Emigre and Foreign Troops in British Service (1) 1792-1803 by René Chartrand

My rating: 2 of 5 stars



First part of Chartrand’s overview of foreign units in British service. The 18th century tradition of employing troops from Switzerland and smaller German princedoms was continued and many French émigrées were recruited to fight the fledgling Republic. A number of similar units were taken over from Dutch service after the French overran Holland early 1795. Dutch and French colonial troops were also incorporated when overseas possessions were conquered by British expeditions.

Most of the units were employed in colonial warfare, especially the West Indies, where disease resulted in high rates of deaths. The reasons for employment overseas were probably to lower chances for desertion and to spare British troops from the bad conditions.

Like its sister book, this is rather an eclectic list of units and uniform details, lacking a overarching narrative, let alone analysis. Only for people with special interest in this subject.




View all my reviews

Review: British Forces in the West Indies 1793-1815

British Forces in the West Indies 1793-1815 by René Chartrand

My rating: 3 of 5 stars



Overview of British forces in the West Indies during revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Not generally known is that this was a major theatre of war for the British at the time (also a major market!) where tens of thousands of troops were sent to attack French colonial possessions, the most important being Saint Domingue, even after it became independent. There was serious concern that the slave revolt in Saint Domingue would spread to other colonies, as it did on Dutch Curacao in 1795 and Jamaica in 1796.

This was also a brutal theatre, with maybe as many as 45,000 British troops dying of fever in the decade up to the peace of Amiens in 1802.

The book is a bit eclectic as it includes so many different and often temporary units, like foreign regiments recruited in Europe, local militias and (Dutch)colonial troops from enemies taken into British service. Interestingly also has images of Jamaican Maroons, black troops from Surinam ('redimusi') and Cuban slave hunters with dogs.



View all my reviews

650 Pages of Annoying Your Audience

Spare me the lame attempts at humour based on national stereotypes. Even if they claim to aim for the opposite. Stephen Clarke´s 1000 Years Of Annoying The French is the kind of book that makes you weep for the insult to the trees felled to print it on.

A bore of a book

I read the part on the Napoleonic Wars to see how it is dished up to a modern British audience. It includes the studied Anglo-Saxon arrogance you'd expect and duly repeats the Nelson mythology. Surprisingly, it gives Napoleon quite some credit for his civil reforms while noting his misogynist streak in law making. It even notices that Waterloo couldn't have been won without the Prussians and that there were Dutch and Germans present.

It is in fact too even handed and serious. This light weight history of Anglo-French relations lacks the consistent wit of 1066 And All That. Had it displayed over the top jingoism at least you could have laughed at that. But adding the odd French bon mot doesn't make up for satire. I honestly recorded only one audible snigger. And it had better been restricted to 200 hundred pages.

It was about this annoying

Somebody please shout out and deliver me of this. Postage is on me.

Keegan's Waterloo

John Keegan´s Face of Battle was major influence on my thinking about warfare as it was for so many others. I read it in university as part of a military history course. I Can see more flaws in it now, but compared to the 'drum and trumpet history' that had gone before this was a significant step forward.

My well worn copy

At about the same time Geoffrey Parker's The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road was published. Together with several other historians, they formed the start of big changes in the study of military history. A turn from the view from above to the view from below, a turn towards primary sources, towards questions of 'how' and towards a more scientific approach instead of jingoism.

I picked up Keegan again recently for my research on Waterloo, and there's many valuable lessons in The Face of Battle, or at least things I will be looking at:

• Each participant only sees a fraction of the whole. He sometimes hardly even sees the enemy. Smoke, terrain obstacles and friendly or enemy troops obscure his vision, and combined with the noise and smell of battle distracts him from anything further away. However, the appearance of general officers in the own or enemy lines is frequently noticed.
• The effect of hunger, thirst, tiredness, rain and sun, corn fields and mud, alcohol and the experience of combat on a soldier's emotions
• Formations are more open than we tend to assume and even more open than implied in the descriptions by the participants. Movement is also slower. Few cavalry charges are made at the gallop; obstacles and casualties can slow them down to a crawl.
• The fate of those trying to surrender depends on the circumstances. Early in the battle there is room for capture, but rarely during the crisis. Distance always matters, because combat has a territorial quality, especially in and around buildings.
• Flight is not just a matter of casualties: the Imperial Guard suffered fewer casualties than many of the regiments opposing them.
• Also, flight seems to start at the rear of the unit (especially columns), rather than at the front. Even though Keegan can't really prove this (he only has accounts from British observers, not from French survivors) nor explain.
• Looting was pervasive, and more profitable than soldiering. It could be a threat to the order of the formation, so officers tried to prevent it during battle.
• The prospect of loot, personal honour, courage, alcohol, physical coercion might have been motivations for individuals to stand instead of run, but Keegan sees two factors as paramount: group solidarity and individual leadership.
• The formation, especially the square, provided a sense of safety in numbers (false, as Keegan notes). The integrity of the formation was symbolised by the regimental colours and they were attacked and defended with great effort.
• Officers were primarily motivated by their reputation among their peers.  Honour was highly individual, and less tied to the regiment than in later days. In a sense it was a professional code of conduct and stoic acceptance of risk was the measure of it. Getting wounded in the execution of duty and continuing in the field was the highest form of honour for officers to aspire to. 

I can see now that there are severe limitations to the Siborne files, with their disdain for and ignorance of the other participants in the battle. But in the early 1970s it was the easiest accessible corpus of eyewitness accounts on the battle. We're very privileged to have so many other accounts readily available now from Dutch, French and German participants.

This of course has changed the narrative of the battle as a whole (Keegan falls into the same traps as Wheeler and other people who just looked at British and the odd French accounts), but I think the parts on the nature of battle can stand the test of time much better and that of course was his main object with the book. To get an idea of what it was like.

Keegan's book may not have found all the answers, but it was the first to ask the questions.

This last point is one that I think is very important and actually goes against what Keegan says about the lack of loyalty in the new Dutch-Belgian army. The picture of the professional officer he paints is as valid for other armies as it is for the British. Officers were motivated by professional pride, and therefor served as well and as loyal in foreign armies as in that of their home country. Jomini, Clausewitz and the Prince of Orange are well known cases, but many French émigrees served abroad, Irish and Swiss served with credit in the French army. They took their professional alignment very seriously. In 1813-1814 Dutch officers didn't just walk out of the French army, but waited until released from their duty or formally gave up their commission.

This is proved to a large extent by their conduct in the 100 days campaign, where officers generally served their armies faithfully, as did Dutch, Belgian and German officers in French service. Of course we don't know what would have happened had Napoleon won at Waterloo, but I think the amount of officers changing sides would have been small.

The loyalty of the general officers and rank and file was another matter. For the former, loyalty was not to their duty but to their political masters: monarchs (or parliaments). Their relation to the regime could have significant impact on their carreers, especially if they also had political roles or ambitions. Ney's flip-flopping is a case in point (more about that some other time). Napoleon had many reasons to distrust his marshals.

For the rank and file, conscripts in most cases, there was little expectation of loyalty. National sentiments were not by any means as developed as a century later, and few could be expected to foster warm feelings for the ruling elite. Draft dodging was common, especially when the regime was unpopular or the chances of success were deemed low. And once conscripted, many went absent without leave. But as they were loyal to no one, they could also not be expected to rapidly enter the opposing army of their of free will. I think Napoleon would also be disappointed in the number of soldiers joining his eagles should he have proved triumphant.

La Religieuse, Riducule and the War That Made America

I very much enjoyed the French movie La Religieuse, based on the late 18th century book by Denis Diderot, better known for his encyclopedia.

The story is about a daughter of lower gentry that gets send to a convent because her parents can't afford her a dowry. She doesn't want to go but is lured in, then refuses to take the vows. But as she brings shame on her family, it is even more difficult to escape the life of a nun and she goes back, more or less of her own free will. Of course she comes to regret it and the movie then documents her struggle to get out.

It was an interesting look at 18th century society, and gives a bit of background to 18th century gaming.

Another French movie I can recommend for this period is Ridicule. In Ridicule, a lowly nobleman travels to Paris to ask the king's aid in financing a project to improve his village. But as the king is bored with audiences the only way to gain access is through the court circuit in which wit and sarcasm provide the means to attract attention. 

But of course, you guys want hardcore military history, so my last recommendation is through the Bloggers for Charity, not only a lofty cause, but cleverly combined with the miniature refight of the Battle of La Belle Famille in 1759.

The War That Made America is a four part documentary on the French & Indian Wars and has some interesting combat sequences with reenactors. It is also surprisingly good on introducing the perspectives of Britons, Americans, French and Indians of various persuasions. It takes George Washington's experiences as a main lead, and I see this as inescapable if you consider he was involved in some of the actions and that that is the best way to gain the attention of the general audience.