Napoleon's Imperial Headquarters

These two Osprey books form a miniseries, with the first describing the growth and zenith of Napoleon’s headquarters while the second focuses on the 1815 campaign. I bought them to get a better idea of the organisation the imperial household so I could get an idea who was who among the memoirists like Flahaut, de Montesquiou, Mameluke Ali and Fain. 

The books in question plus extra

Apart from that, it was useful to learn the distinctions between the emperor’s Aides de Camp (general officers to be used for independent assignments), his officiers d’ordonnance (junior officers used for inspections and reconnaissance) and the personal Aides de Camp of the Major-Général, Berthiér. Especially as the latter included quite a few critical of the emperor.

For my interests the first part paid too much attention to the civil household, equipment (from coaches to cutlery) and details of camp layout. I would have preferred to learn more of the actual operation of army headquarters. The more limited focus of the second booklet makes it better than its sister. It contains useful information on the composition of the staff, on travel speed and arrangements and a bit more on the actual activity in the army staff. The details on what Napoleon ate and where he slept are more useful to me here as well.

What struck me is that the books are heavily Napoleonophile: the marshals are described as unthankfull and treacherous, and all the mistakes are somebody else's fault. I was actually amazed to find that Pawly had any good words for Soult as Major-Générale. But maybe that’s just playing to the expected audience.

The obvious point to continue the quest are the first few chapters of Elting's Swords Around A Throne.

Weather Vanes: the Art of Changing Sides

Mattijs Lok: Windvanen. Napoleontische Bestuurders in de Nederlandse en Franse Restauratie (1813-1820)

A study of the political survival of Dutch and French members of the Napoleonic regime during the Restoration. This book draws its strength from the comparison between the two countries, the analysis of the rite de passage that was inherent in crossing the political lines and the description of the popular press criticising the ´weather vanes´.

Despite the political revolution of 1813/1815 many bureaucrats, officers and senior politicians remained in office. How did they manage? Over the course of the regime change, the senior politicians were able to shape the events by shifting their loyalty. They did not all do so at the same time and not always out of conviction. But by their conversion in a period when the new regime had not settled they moved the scales in the right direction, thus ingratiating themselves with the new rulers.

The new regimes needed experience bureaucrats and, being still weak, had no ambition to create an internal opposition from the start. Also, both Willem Frederik and Louis XVIII had previously sought Napoleon’s favour themselves so they could not claim the moral high ground.

There was also a striking continuity in the institutions of the old regime, despite public displays of the restoration of the ancient regime. The Napoleonic legacy was not only popular enough that a real return to the old institutions would have created such unrest as to unbalance the fledgling monarchies, the bureaucracy was also very useful to the Louis and William. The imperial system of government was a top down authoritarian administration subjected to the needs of the emperor and the military. It gave the restored monarchs more power than their ancestors had had before the revolution.

But there was such a broad sense of unease that much of the Napoleonic bureaucracy remained that this continuity was downplayed as much as possible while stressing the need for unity and reconciliation. This narrative was enforced so strongly in the Netherlands that opposition to King William was stifled for years.

But discontent could not be suppressed entirely. The most committed supporters of the returned Houses of Bourbon and Orange could not hide their disappointment. Not only did they resent that former opponents went unpunished and were even rewarded, but more so they lamented that their suffering for the cause had gone unnoticed. They had sacrificed their careers for their convictions and now felt insufficiently compensated. They took out their revenge on the weather vanes by publicly holding them to account for their lack of conviction.

A successful conversion went to several phases. The first (optional) step was a request to the old ruler to be relieved from the oath of loyalty. Next a letter was written proclaiming adhesion to the new rulers. This was often a convoluted document defending the choices for former regimes in the past. Most times this was followed by an invitation from the new prince to enter his service. This later involved swearing a new oath. The monarch later confirmed the union by continuing the noble titles from the Napoleonic regime or awarding new. Knightly orders were also instituted so the king could express his gratitude.

The move from regime to regime was by no means an easy one. In the Netherlands it took several weeks before it became clear that the rising against French rule would succeed, and many preferred to bide their time before committing themselves. In France the dismantling of Napoleon’s rule in April 1814 was more rapid, but complications erupted as the emperor returned. It forced politicians, bureaucrats and officers to make difficult choices twice in three months.

And so it went wrong occasionally, as in the cases of Dutch admiral Ver Huell and bureaucrat/general Dirk van Hogendorp. Ver Huell eventually ended up in the French Chamber of Peers, but Van Hogendorp met a tragic death in Brazil. In France marshal Ney was the prime example of failure to choose wisely. He died in front of a fire squad.

The second restoration of the Bourbons was in any way more traumatic than the first and the Dutch. To the reactionary ultra monarchists the reversal of many bureaucrats to the returned emperor was a betrayal of the magnanimous treatment they had been offered in 1814. This inspired the ultras to sweeping purges of a quarter to a third of all French bureaucrats. In some parts of the country this even escalated into mass arrests, and occasional murder and lynching. Although Louis and his government discouraged these excesses, they were nevertheless tainted by them and their legitimacy of their regime was weakened as a result.

Although this book focuses almost exclusively on the civilian side of the bureaucracy, there are some interesting bits on the military and the rite de passage analogy is readily applicable to army officers. Maybe I can use it to analyse letters by Dutch officers in the National Archives in The Hague.

A Bold and Ambitious Enterprise by Andrew Bamford

In December 1813 the British cabinet decided to create a force to operate in the Low Countries to assure that the area came under friendly rule, for which a suitable dynasty was quickly found in the House of Orange. Task of the force was to ensure the security of the new regime, then the expansion of that regime in to present day Belgium and the destruction of the French fleet in Antwerp if not the capture of the town. This book relates the story of that ‘bold and ambitious enterprise’.

I found the book interesting for three reasons:

A Bold and Ambitious Enterprise tells the story of a significant part of the army that would fight Napoleon at Quatre Bras and Waterloo a year later. It was led by the aged but capable general Graham, who had served with Wellington in the Peninsula. Its origins were not very fateful, cobbled together from units recovering and rebuilding from service elsewhere. Many of the men were only partially trained or otherwise unfit for service. It took time to gather enough strength to take aggressive action, but in reality was unable to do so without support from allied troops.

Although the troops performed as well as might be expected in two small scale attacks against the defences of Antwerp, the force failed its toughest test: the storming of Bergen op Zoom. This weak and isolated French garrison was a thorn in the flesh of the allies, occupying troops that Graham wished to employ against his main objective. The failure of the attack resulted mostly from insufficient troops employed and failure of leadership by senior commanders. Some went off on their own, thus leaving troops leaderless, other showed a lack of initiative. It all ended in half of the forces killed, wounded or captured. All this bodes ill for the performance a year later.

De Gevangenpoort or Prisoners Gate between the town centre and harbour
A British section held out here until forced away in the morning

The book also provides a counterpoint to the better known developments in France. Although this is just a sideshow, it shows the ways in which the area might have been more important had Napoleon successfully held off the Schlesische Armee and the Hauptarmee. It is interesting to see how the course of the war in France progressively allows or demands more troops to be shifted south.

Finally, it has more consideration for the position of Britain´s allies, ie the Dutch and Prussians, than most British authors. This prevents the book from the all too familiar blame game. Although Graham kept trying to get his allies to cooperate in a move against Antwerp (his main objective), it was understandable that their efforts were limited by overriding considerations elsewhere. The book also shows that quite a few people in prominent places during the Waterloo campaign had already acquainted themselves with their allies and struck up a workable relationship (eg Cooke, Bülow and Van Gorkum). That would prove useful.

The book is well written and makes good use of personal accounts. Although I didn’t care much for the details of British involvement, it was nice to read about the attack on Bergen op Zoom, having visited the town in September. Too bad not much of the fortress has remained.

Review: French Guardsman vs Russian Jaeger: 1812-14

French Guardsman vs Russian Jaeger: 1812-14 by Laurence Spring

My rating: 3 of 5 stars



I’m not decided about this new Osprey Combat series yet. Not surprisingly, this series feels a lot like the Duel series where tanks, combat planes and ships are compared. The results there are mixed, and I’m less a hardware man than a tactics man, so I have only bought one or two of those.

It’s a good thing that Osprey’s taking a few lesser known Napoleonic actions and focussing more on the tactics, but the series is hampered by combining tidbits you’d expect in Warrior series (recruiting, equipment), Essential History (Background), Campaign (Into Combat) and Elite (tactics). In this case it meant that it took a long time before you got to the actual battles.

Author Laurence Spring has a good knowledge of the period and, most importantly, first hand accounts of the battles (although those on Leipzig are very limited, but I guess they needed to include one big battle) which add spice to the narrative. In fact the account of the Young Guard Voltigeurs’ destruction ay Krasnyi had me holding my breath. But this is what I would have wanted more of, and less historical introduction.

Also, the choice of Russian Jaeger and French Young Guard is not the most obvious, because they are not wholly different troop types. In fact, as Spring shows, they both could use light infantry tactics and operate in close formation.

This doesn’t mean that the idea behind the series can’t work. But there have to be significant differences in tactics or equipment between the two sides to make it work. I can see how Zulu Warrior vs British infantryman could work, or Greek hoplite vs Roman legionary or in even terms of Napoleonics: Cuirassier vs infantry (I would actually love to see an Osprey book about horse artillery in action). But the present choices seem too similar.

So my gripes so far with this series is not that I don’t like the idea, but that they make the wrong choices of adversaries and what to focus on. The choice for small and lesser known actions combined with tactics and first hand accounts has my blessing. I’ll catch another one from the series later, but don’t hold my hopes too high.




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Reading priorities for January

There's a bunch of books I hope to be reading this month in five groups:

 

• The biographies of Willem I and Willem II regarding their activities up to 1815

• 1814 Campaign. For lessons to Napoleon and general strategical dilemma of defense of France, as well as performance of French and allied armies. Already did Uffindel, next Leggiere's Fall of Napoleon, Petre's Napoleon at Bay and Bamford's Bold and Ambitious Enterprise

• Dutch Army 1780-1815. Showing experience, organisation, mobilisation post 1813 etc. Whole bunch of books & articles

• Dutch economy 1780-1815: De Vries & Van der Woude, as well as Van Zanden & Van Riel

• Economics and mobilisation of other main powers. Bunch of books, but hardly complete.

Review: Napoleon's Overseas Army

Napoleon's Overseas Army by René Chartrand

My rating: 3 of 5 stars



Broad description of the dress and actions of French colonial units during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. With the 20 year struggle between France and Great Britain, it is not surprising that fighting also reached France's and the Dutch colonial possessions, as the Britons steadily gobbled up the French empire overseas, with only a short intermission after the Peace of Amiens in 1802.

This book focuses mainly on the Americas, rather than Asia and Africa. The war of independence of the former slave population of Saint Domingue, present day Haïti, features prominently. There's even a short section on the Dutch colonial troops in the West Indies.



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650 Pages of Annoying Your Audience

Spare me the lame attempts at humour based on national stereotypes. Even if they claim to aim for the opposite. Stephen Clarke´s 1000 Years Of Annoying The French is the kind of book that makes you weep for the insult to the trees felled to print it on.

A bore of a book

I read the part on the Napoleonic Wars to see how it is dished up to a modern British audience. It includes the studied Anglo-Saxon arrogance you'd expect and duly repeats the Nelson mythology. Surprisingly, it gives Napoleon quite some credit for his civil reforms while noting his misogynist streak in law making. It even notices that Waterloo couldn't have been won without the Prussians and that there were Dutch and Germans present.

It is in fact too even handed and serious. This light weight history of Anglo-French relations lacks the consistent wit of 1066 And All That. Had it displayed over the top jingoism at least you could have laughed at that. But adding the odd French bon mot doesn't make up for satire. I honestly recorded only one audible snigger. And it had better been restricted to 200 hundred pages.

It was about this annoying

Somebody please shout out and deliver me of this. Postage is on me.

Chemin des Dames books

Last week I brought Some books for Michiel, since he's going to camp around Compiegne in France this summer. Right in the middle of a number of WWI battlefields.

For a number of years I used to go to the nearby Champagne Ardennes region for a weekend in summer with a bunch of friends. On a few occassions we visited the Chemin des Dames battlefields, and I picked up the books in the picture.

One local guide, with a cover by Tardi, the French comic artist who has had a great impact on the way we see WWI. And another a more extensive account of the many battles fought on the Chemin des Dames, starting with the 1814 battle of Craonne (Napoleon's Last Victory), the 1914 battles, the disastrous 1917 offensive and the German offensive of 1918.

Added are two monographies: Pyrrhic Victory by Robert Doughty on the French Army in WWI and Pierre Miquel's book on the Chemin des Dames. And finally an issue of the French WWI magazine Tranchées, dealing with the offensive with limited objectives, among which the capture of Fort Malmaison on the Chemin des Dames in October 1917.

So Michiel is well prepared for his holiday.

Michiel bought me a Dutch translation of Albert Nofi's book on Waterloo for my birthday. An interesting take, you can spot the wargamer from miles away.

L'Armee de l'Orient

Picked this one up in Levanto on Saturday in a huge stack of second hand books. Interesting to kniw how it ended up there.

This is the account of Sarrail's command of the Armee de l'Orient in Macedonia from late 1915 to spring 1918. Published in 1920.

Sarrail was reluctant to go there, as he had been relieved of his army command on the west front and this was obviously a side show. He demanded and got an army command, more troops and independence from the Brits.